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189 
The Joy of Takings 
Michael M. Berger

 
When I graduated from Washington University Law School about 
half-a-century ago, I never dreamed that I would spend my career 
studying, litigating, and teaching cutting-edge constitutional law. Yet, 
that has been my reality. True, it is a specialized niche of 
constitutional law, but it has been—and continues to be—on the 
cutting edge. 
My particular edge concerns real property: specifically, the right 
of property owners to make productive use of their land without 
undue government interference—or, to put it in the vernacular, 
takings law. I got there in a way that almost looks planned. I wish I 
had been that clever, but it was more a case of the dominoes falling in 
a consistent pattern. So, pay attention. Despite what they tell you in 
law school, this is how it works in the real world. 
It all started in my second year of law school, when I retrieved 
one of those ubiquitous notes from a bulletin board. A professor 
needed some research assistance. The professor was Dan Mandelker 
and his field was land use. I spent two years doing research for him 
related to land use and planning, and taking his advanced land use 
course along the way. Although Dan and I have differed over the 
substance of takings law, I learned much about constitutional issues 
from those land use cases that had been overlooked in the formal 
Constitutional Law course (as it was taught then—and continues to 
be in many law schools).
1
 
 
  Partner, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP, resident in the Los Angeles office; co-chair 
of the firm’s Appellate Practice Group; Adjunct Professor of Law, Washington University in St. 
Louis.  
 1. See Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in Regulatory 
Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 99, 99 n.1 (2000). Although many property courses now 
cover takings law, I understand that many constitutional law professors continue to ignore the 
last phrase of the Fifth Amendment. 
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After graduation, Professor Mandelker introduced me to Professor 
George Lefcoe at the University of Southern California, where I was 
accepted into a graduate program leading to a Masters of Law Degree 
in real property. The major part of my LL.M. program consisted of a 
thesis on some real property topic. Discussions with Professor Lefcoe 
revealed that there was a substantial—and growing—amount of 
litigation involving the relationship between airports and their 
neighbors. Luckily (from the standpoint of being able to do empirical 
research), much of it was in Southern California. Specifically, airport 
neighbors were claiming that aircraft operations were taking their 
properties (or interests in them) without payment of compensation. 
The result was that I wrote a lengthy article discussing virtually every 
airport v. neighbor case that had been reported in the United States, 
augmented by interviews with lawyers handling such litigation from 
coast to coast.
2  
That was my first contact with takings law, and the joy was 
unalloyed. As something of a young amateur scholar, I was able to 
focus complete attention on a legal field in which there was much 
confusion. True, there were two decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court 
that should have shown the way (at least in the airport context),
3
 but 
state courts were uncertain and had begun going in divergent ways.
4 
By building on the solid foundation of the Supreme Court decisions, I 
was able to create a pretty well fleshed out theory dealing with the 
relationship between airports and their neighbors.
5
 
 
 2. Michael M. Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 631 (1970). 
 3. Griggs v. Allegheny Cty., 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 
(1946). Although Causby involved an airport owned by the United States and used by U.S. 
military aircraft, Griggs was a civilian airport serving commercial airlines. Between them, these 
Supreme Court decisions made clear that the airport operator was responsible for damage 
caused to neighbors by airport construction and operation. 
 4. They were actively aided and abetted by counsel representing various airports who 
kept stirring the pot with specious arguments and fomenting confusion. For earlier discussions 
of such ploys, see, for example, Michael M. Berger, Property, Democracy, & the Constitution, 
5 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 45, 87 n.230 and accompanying text (2016); Michael 
M. Berger, Strong and Informed Advocacy Can Shape the Law: A Personal Journey, 4 
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 1, 3–5 (2015); Michael M. Berger, The California 
Supreme Court—A Shield Against Governmental Overreaching: Nestle v. City of Santa 
Monica, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 199, 244–52 (1973). 
 5. The original graduate thesis cited in note 2, supra, was later augmented by the 
following: Jerold A. Fadem & Michael M. Berger, A Noisy Airport is a Damned Nuisance, 3 
SW. L. REV. 39 (1971); Michael M. Berger, You Know I Can’t Hear You When the Planes Are 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/20
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The unanticipated beauty of the Master’s Degree was that I ended 
up taking a job as an associate (and soon thereafter a partner) in the 
Los Angeles law firm handling the largest volume of airport noise 
litigation and, from that vantage point, using my graduate thesis in 
actual legal practice for about the next two decades. In fact, I argued 
every airport noise case considered by the California Supreme Court 
after my admission to the Bar except one
6—and in that missing one, I 
appeared as amicus curiae and presented the arguments that 
eventually persuaded the court.
7
 The joy that had begun with 
unrestricted research had converted itself into successful litigation.
8
 
But the true joy of a takings practice that has lasted this long lies 
in the constantly changing character of the kinds of cases that raise 
takings issues and the ingenuity of the government lawyers (and, for 
quite a while, a compliant judiciary that too often bought those 
arguments). That may seem counterintuitive. But the joy in facing 
radically incorrect arguments that are accepted by trial courts is that 
cases enter the appellate product stream very quickly and are 
evaluated on appeal based on the facts as alleged in the complaint, 
rather than dealing with the confusion that sometimes arises from 
 
Flying, 4 URB. LAW. 1 (1972); Michael M. Berger, The California Supreme Court—A Shield 
Against Governmental Overreaching: Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 199 
(1973); Michael M. Berger, Airport Operator Liability: Continuing Liability for Continuous 
Tortfeasors, 9 L.A. LAW. 27 (Dec. 1986); Michael M. Berger, Airport Noise in the 1980s: It’s 
Time for Airport Operators to Acknowledge the Injury They Inflict On Neighbors, INST. ON 
PLAN., ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN, ch. 10 (Sw. Legal Found. 1987). 
 6. I briefed and argued each of the following: Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 496 P.2d 
480 (Cal. 1972) (government agencies are liable for nuisance); City of San Jose v. Superior 
Court, 525 P.2d 701 (Cal. 1974) (claim for airport noise damage may be filed on behalf of 
class; but class lawsuit not appropriate, as each parcel is unique); Britt v. Superior Court, 574 
P.2d 766 (Cal. 1978) (statute of limitations must be liberally applied so as to permit trial); 
Greater Westchester Homeowners Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 603 P.2d 1329 (Cal. 1979) 
(victims of airport nuisance may recover damages for emotional disturbance).  
 7. Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 865 (Cal. 1985). 
 8. See also City of Inglewood v. City of Los Angeles, 451 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(class action on behalf of neighboring city; neighbors held to be third party beneficiaries of 
promises made by airport operator to federal government in exchange for grants); City of Los 
Angeles v. Decker, 558 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1977) (misconduct for government lawyer to 
misrepresent facts to jury).  
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having to deal with conflicting factual testimony (not to mention all 
the time wasted in trial court litigation).
9
  
Try this one, that was actually made—at first in writing and then 
repeated in court with a straight face—in an airport noise case: 
Standing by itself, Los Angeles International Airport is 
basically a mass of concrete and steel. Any problems with 
respect to the Plaintiff only arise when jet aircraft land and 
take off from the Airport. Therefore, it is the jet aircraft’s use 
of the airport that actually generates Plaintiff’s cause of action 
for negligence, not the operation, management and control of 
the Airport by the Defendant.
10
 
This argument was made two decades after the U.S. Supreme Court 
clearly explained that liability for damage inflicted on neighbors 
rested on the airport operator, as the one that decided to build an 
airport in the first place and then decided where to build it and how 
much land to acquire for it. In the Court’s view, once an airport is 
built, the airplanes that use it are as much on tracks as railroad trains: 
they have no choice but to land and take off as the runways direct 
them.
11 
And yet it took decades before some significant airport 
operators acknowledged the verity of that concept and stopped 
fighting with their neighbors. 
Another story from the annals of airport litigation demonstrates 
some of the chicanery that takes the place of legal analysis and 
argument. In 1972, the California Supreme Court decided Nestle v. 
City of Santa Monica.
12
 The key holding was that airport operators 
could be liable to their neighbors under settled theories of nuisance 
law for the noxious by-products of aircraft using their facilities.
13
 The 
City of Los Angeles, which was not a party to the litigation, went into 
 
 9. No intent to denigrate trial lawyers, but as an appellate lawyer/quondam scholar, my 
focus has always been on the legal issues. The faster we can get to appellate courts that have the 
jurisdiction to enter binding judgments on the law, the better we appellate-types like it. 
 10. Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Malandrinos v. City of Los Angeles, No. 138136 at 33–34 (L.A. Super. 
Ct. 1983). 
 11. Griggs v. Allegheny Cty., 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962). 
 12. Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 496 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1972). 
 13. Id. 
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panic mode (or at least some parts of its internal apparatus did), as 
shown in the letter quoted here. Its City Attorney prepared a 
“confidential” letter (said to be covered by the attorney-client 
privilege) to the Los Angeles City Council, analyzing the Nestle 
opinion and projecting its impact on the much greater operations 
under the control of Los Angeles—primarily Los Angeles 
International Airport. In that letter, the City Attorney purported to 
“advise” his client that the impact of nuisance liability at LAX would 
be so massive that the airport needed to close. In his words: 
It would therefore appear that the only prudent course for the 
city to follow is to advise all the airlines using Los Angeles 
International Airport and the Federal Aviation Administration 
that in 30 days the airport will suspend operations . . . . .
14
 
Notwithstanding the “confidential” nature of this communication, a 
copy of the letter was leaked to the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner 
which, believing that it had a real scoop on its hands, put out an 
“Extra” edition of that evening’s paper with the headline:  
L.A. AIRPORT FACES 
SHUTDOWN IN 30 DAYS.
15
 
After weeks of hearings and press conferences, the Los Angeles 
City Attorney conceded that it had all been a “ploy”—an attempt to 
stampede the Supreme Court into reconsidering Nestle.
16 
(Spoiler 
alert: it didn’t work, although it spooked a lot of ordinary folk—not 
to mention the editors at the Herald-Examiner). 
But it was not only airport operators that acted in this fashion. 
Power tends to do things to people. Give them the ability to say that 
they are acting in the interest of the public good and Lord Acton’s 
aphorism about power’s corrosive effects takes on added weight. 
Take what should be routine planning and zoning issues. In today’s 
world, planning and zoning documents are not simply drawn hastily 
on the backs of napkins, nor do they do no more than follow the 
 
 14. Quoted in L.A. HERALD-EXAMINER, May 2, 1972, at 1, col. 8. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Editorial, Nuisance Suits and Our Airports, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 1972, p. 2, at 6, 
col. 1. 
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tracks of neighborhood bovines.
17 
They are the product of hearings 
(sometimes, many hearings) with input from all sorts of interest 
groups and individuals before the city council (or board of 
supervisors or whatever the local governing body is called) formally 
adopts such documents. When adopted, a city’s general (or 
comprehensive or master) plan has been likened to the “constitution” 
for the area,
18
 “or perhaps more accurately [to] a charter for future 
development,”19 “located at the top of ‘the hierarchy of local 
government law regulating land use.’”20 
But what happens if, after all that effort, the governing body 
doesn’t really like the way its planning and zoning efforts work in 
some specific area and its members decide to change the official 
plans on their own, ad hoc, disregarding all that careful planning? 
Such a situation arose in Monterey, California. The property was a 
37.6-acre, roughly rectangular parcel of land on the Pacific Ocean 
coast at the City’s northern end. Many years before the current owner 
bought it, the City zoned the property for multi-family residential use, 
in keeping with the commercial, industrial, and multi-family 
residential uses virtually surrounding it—allowing 29 units per acre, 
or more than 1,000 homes for the entire parcel.
21
  
But the owners didn’t want to build 1,000 units. Or anything 
close. Rather, in 1981, they submitted an application for only a 344-
home development—one third of that allowed by the zoning. The 
City’s Planning Commission rejected the proposal, complaining 
(oxymoronically in light of its own zoning ordinance) that the 
development was too dense. But the City went beyond mere denial. It 
did some additional off-the-cuff planning, advising that a proposal for 
 
 17. Urban mythology has it, for example, that the streets in Boston were laid out by 
meandering cows. Boston Cow Paths, CELEBRATE BOS., http://www.celebrateboston.com/ 
strange/cow-paths.htm.  
 18. O’Loane v. O’Rourke, 42 Cal. Rptr. 283 (Ct. App. 1965). 
 19. Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317, 322 (Cal. 1990). 
 20. DeVita v. County of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1024 (Cal. 1995). Land use planning 
employs a number of tools that can be viewed hierarchically. At the top is a municipality’s most 
potent, called either a general or comprehensive or master plan. Beneath that plan are various 
zoning ordinances and planning documents. But the controlling document is always the general 
plan. 
 21. All of the facts concerning this development are recited in the Supreme Court’s 
decision. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999). 
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264 units—that comes to 7 units per acre for those who are 
mathematically challenged—would be received favorably.22  
The owners, at considerable expense, redesigned the project 
accordingly, keeping in constant contact with the City’s planners to 
ensure that their new plan would be in keeping with City desires. In 
1983, they submitted their plan for the 264 units the City said it 
wanted. However, the City Planning Commission again turned down 
the application. This time, the City asked for a 224-unit 
development.
23
  
The owners then complied with the City’s 224-home demand. But 
when they took that one to City Hall, in early 1984, the same 
Planning Commission that solicited this proposal said “no.” The 
owners appealed to the City Council, which remanded the matter to 
the Planning Commission with directions to consider a 190-unit 
development, representing a further fifteen-percent reduction in 
homes and a corresponding fifteen-percent reduction in ground 
coverage. To review the bidding, that is zoning for more than 1,000 
units and plan submissions for 344 units, 264 units, 224 units, and 
finally 190 units.
24
 
But the City would not approve even the highly restricted 190-unit 
design. Why? The City thought it had a trump card up its municipal 
sleeve: an endangered insect called the Smith’s Blue Butterfly. After 
five years of planning and re-planning, the City said that there was 
nowhere on the entire thirty-seven plus acres on which anything 
could be built because the property was said to be needed (1) to 
protect the viewshed from the adjacent freeway,
25 
(2) to provide 
buffer zones for the surrounding properties, or (3) to provide habitat 
for that endangered butterfly.
26
 One intriguing thing about that 
butterfly is that not one of them had ever been seen on this property. 
Ever.
27
 The City simply ordered the property preserved (on the if-
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. The facts surrounding this development may also be found in the intermediate 
appellate opinion. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422 (9th 
Cir. 1996). 
 25. That is, the ability of freeway drivers to gaze at the coast as they speed by. 
 26. Del Monte Dunes, 95 F.3d at 1433–34. 
 27. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 695. 
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you-build-it-they-will-come theory of the movie “Field of Dreams”) 
and left the owner holding a very empty bag. Eventually, the case 
resulted in a substantial verdict for the property owner which was 
affirmed by both the court of appeals
28
 and the U.S. Supreme Court.
29
 
There are also government agencies that feel that it is legitimate to 
seek to balance their budgets on the backs of whichever convenient 
fish happens to have jumped into the barrel at the wrong time. The 
City of Patterson, California, for example, required builders of homes 
to assist lower income families to buy homes by including some 
“affordable housing” in their projects. As with many such 
regulations, this one allowed each developer to buy out of the 
requirement (some might call it ransom) for a fee of $734 per house 
(that the City promised to use to build housing elsewhere).
30
 That 
could be raised, but only if the increase was “reasonably justified.” 
Three years later, the City increased the fee—to $20,946 per house.31 
With a straight face, the City claimed that monstrous increase was 
“reasonably justified.” Even in California (and California courts have 
not been notably sympathetic toward land developers), that wouldn’t 
fly.
32
 But entities and lawyers who make arguments that cannot be 
said with a straight face bring some enjoyment to those who practice 
on the opposite side. 
Or how about an agency of the federal government, urging in 
serious mien that a property owner should not even be allowed to 
appear in court to defend against the government’s action without 
first paying a fine of $686,443.53 (plus interest)?
33
 No one—except a 
panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (the most often reversed 
court in the country)—could swallow that. The U.S. Supreme Court 
unanimously reversed.
34
 
Another aspect of my personal joy has been the ability to share 
my feelings about this sometimes arcane field of the law with 
students: at law schools, at continuing legal education programs for 
 
 28. Del Monte Dunes, 95 F.3d 1422. 
 29. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687. 
 30. Bldg. Indus. Assn. v. City of Patterson, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63, 65 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013). 
 34. Id. 
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practicing lawyers, and in scholarly journals. I have taught aspects of 
takings and land use law at the University of Miami Law School, 
Washington University Law School, and the University of Southern 
California Law School. The number of continuing education courses 
in which I have participated has stretched from Honolulu, Hawaii to 
Oxford (England, not Mississippi). There have been scores of law 
review articles.
35 
Even after all these years, I still get a kick out of 
explaining that takings law is neither as simple nor as complex as 
some people seem to believe.
36
 It is just different, and it is based on 
an express constitutional guarantee. Part of what I have enjoyed most 
has been correcting some of these erroneous beliefs.
37
 
Other times, the joy of the practice has been meeting people. Take 
Frank Kottschade. Frank was a home builder in Rochester, 
Minnesota. He had been involved in the local real estate business and 
in organizations of fellow developers long enough to have become 
familiar with some of the legal concepts that defined, and sometimes 
hamstrung, his ability to do his job. One of those was the so-called 
ripeness doctrine, discussed in the following text. 
When expressed generally, the ripeness concept sounds benign. It 
holds only that a case should not be adjudicated in court until it is 
ripe enough to be there—until all necessary preconditions have been 
 
 35. I was on a panel last year with a respected professor from a major law school and was 
told that he had written more than seventy articles. I found that number striking until I looked at 
my own CV and realized that I too had written more than seventy articles—and carried on a 
full-time law practice at the same time. 
 36. See articles cited infra, note 37. 
 37. Some have expressed the simplistic thought that as long as the government acts for a 
good reason there can be no taking, while others have spun more complex theories. All are 
discussed in these articles: Michael M. Berger, Property, Democracy, & the Constitution, 5 
BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 45 (2016); Michael M. Berger, My Head Is Spinning: 
and Now a Word from the Sponsor of Del Monte Dunes, 9 CAL. LAND USE L. & POL’Y REP. 1 
(Sept. 1999); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, The Need for Takings Law Reform: A View 
From the Trenches—A Response to Taking Stock of the Takings Debate, 38 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 837 (1998); Michael M. Berger & Gideon Kanner, Thoughts on the White River Junction 
Manifesto: A Reply to the “Gang of Five’s” Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking 
of Property, 19 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 685 (1986); Michael M. Berger, Is an ‘Innovative Scheme’ a 
New Label For Confiscating Private Property?, 51 L.A. B.J. 222 (1975); Michael M. Berger, 
Do Planners Really Chafe at Being Fair?, 41 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Apr. 1989, No. 4, 
at 3; Michael M. Berger, The State’s Police Power Is Not (Yet) the Power of a Police State, 35 
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., May 1983, No. 5, at 4. 
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satisfied.
38 
As applied to land development cases, however, the courts 
have created a virulent weapon that has been employed to radically 
restrict the provision of needed housing.
39
 The most harshly applied 
part of this doctrine holds that a property owner cannot seek 
constitutional redress in federal court until he has sought—and been 
denied—compensation in state court under parallel provisions of state 
constitutional law.
40
 
Many people thought that was unfair. Indeed, more than once 
Congress sought to change that rule, only to see majority votes in 
both houses frustrated by filibusters.
41
 Frank Kottschade volunteered 
for what was essentially a suicide mission. He cast himself in the 
classic role of the soldier who throws himself on the grenade to save 
the platoon. He had a housing project that had been turned down by 
the city council on grounds that could almost certainly have been 
overturned in state court. Yet he decided to have a case developed 
that might reach the Supreme Court and allow the ripeness rule to be 
dealt with once and for all, in the only court that could deal with it.
42
 
Frank’s plan was simple. Given the state of the law, his federal 
district court complaint would be quickly dismissed as a matter of 
law, followed by an equally swift affirmation by the court of appeals. 
At that point, he would be able to roll the dice for the low percentage 
 
 38. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM § 2.5 (7th ed. 2015). 
 39. This body of land use law has been described by scholars on both sides of the issue as 
well as trial and appellate courts in terms such as “misleading,” “deceptive,” “absurd,” 
“pernicious,” “draconian,” and “a procedural morass.” Citations to these and numerous other 
critiques of the land use variant of “ripeness” are collected in Michael M. Berger & Gideon 
Kanner, Shell Game! You Can’t Get There from Here. Supreme Court Ripeness Jurisprudence 
in Takings Cases at Long Last Reaches the Self-Parody Stage, 36 URB. LAW. 671, 702–04 
(2004). 
 40. Williamson County Reg. Plan. Commn. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). See 
authorities collected in Michael M. Berger, The Ripeness Game: Why Are We Still Forced to 
Play?, 30 TOURO L. REV. 297 (2014). 
 41. See John Delaney & Duane Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the “Ripeness Mess”? A 
Call for Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB. LAW. 195 
(1999) (discussing companion bills introduced in the House (HR 1534) and Senate (S 2271) 
during the 105th Congress from 1997 to 1998. The House bill received a majority vote of 248 
to 178, but the Senate bill received only 52 votes—a majority, but not enough to override a 
filibuster). 
 42. The rule had been created by the Supreme Court, thus essentially eliminating the 
likelihood (or even the ability) of any lower court to overturn it. 
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shot of being one of the seventy-five or so cases accepted for review 
each year by the Supreme Court. The district court cooperated, as did 
the court of appeals.
43
 It was a good plan. The court of appeals 
understood completely what was going on, but concluded that if 
change were to come, it would have to come from the Supreme 
Court, “not us.”44 
The Supreme Court petition followed, supported by numerous 
private entities as well as briefs filed on behalf of numerous members 
of Congress, who complained that this ripeness issue was a serious 
matter of federal court jurisdiction, on which a majority of Congress 
wanted action
45—action that was stymied by Senate procedures. If 
you are at all familiar with these cases, you know that certiorari was 
denied. As I said, although the entire process was a delight (other 
than the final outcome), the real joy may have been in meeting and 
associating with someone like Frank Kottschade, someone who was 
willing to put his own money (not to mention a perfectly good 
residential development) on the line for a principle in which he 
believed, that is that the federal courts should be available for 
vindication of the constitutional rights of property owners, just like 
other citizens with other constitutional issues. 
As technology develops, the law may be coming full circle. The 
latest development in the field of land use is closely related to the 
place where I began: invasive machinery flying overhead. In today’s 
argot: drones.
46
 The fascinating thing about drones is that although 
the technology has changed to the point where an autonomous flying 
device can be held in one’s hand and controlled like a child’s toy, the 
legal issues raised are quite similar to the ones raised by manned 
aircraft all those decades ago. People worry about drones trespassing 
 
 43. Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 319 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 44. Id. at 1041. 
 45. See U.S. CONST. art. III. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Honorable Steve Chabot, 
Chair, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of 
Representatives, in Support of Appellant Frank Kottschade in Kottschade v. City of Rochester, 
124 S. Ct. 178 (2003) (explaining recent legislative efforts to reach a procedural solution to the 
ripeness problem, until they ended in filibusters; he asked the Court for guidance and none was 
provided).  
 46. See Michael M. Berger, Some Thoughts on Drones, 30 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., No. 5, 
Sept. 2014, at 57; Wendie L. Kellington & Michael M. Berger, Why Land Use Lawyers Care 
About the Law of Unmanned Systems, 37 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., No. 6, June 2014, at 1. 
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on private property, spying on private individuals and the like. Issues 
of local and federal control are omnipresent. The law dealing with 
airplane nuisances is based on the premise that someone (almost 
always a government agency) will own and operate the airport from 
which the craft operate. Drone technology is different. Drones can be 
launched from your window, or your porch, or your back yard. 
Unless the government restricts their operational locale, which it has 
not done—yet. Thus, drones present as many issues of local land use 
and takings law as they do of federal regulatory law. This ride has 
just begun, but it will surely prove to be just as interesting as the ones 
that have gone before. 
In concluding, we should at least note the rising wave of virtual 
reality and its impact on the real world. Heard of Pokémon GO? 
Unless you have been vacationing on Mars, you probably have. It is a 
generation beyond drones because it is not even real. And yet it is. 
How it will impact land use and takings law is something that I 
probably should leave to someone in the next generation to discuss. I 
am too technophobic even to think about it 
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